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Bilkent University 
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Intra-state conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Since 1945 they have 
been more frequent and more violent than inter-state warfare (SIPRI-
UNESCO Handbook, 1998: 13-25). With the end ofthe Cold War, these 
tendencies exuberated following mostly in the lines of ethno-national 
and separatist-armed conflicts, bringing a significant shift in the per-
ception of security issues and alternative approaches to it, especially in 
Europe. In patticular, the changing discourse of sovereignty, identity 
and security, and international responsibility appears to be increasingly 
significant. Considering that the conditions for international relations 
depend on both empirical validity and logical soundness, a theoretical 
exercise on the case of intra-state conflicts questions the validity of the 
traditional state developed concept of security. The path is open for 
new interpretations and understanding of normative, operational and 
structural issues in contemporacy world politics. 
The paper will take a cl oser look at the case of Kosovo so as to con-
si der the applicability of the arguments raised in it. Nevertheless, the 
aim of the paper is neither to reveal the Iarge-extended problematic by 
enumerating ali circumstances and effecting factors relevant to the case, 
nor to detail ali means and strategies that can be used to resolve the 
case. These limitations are done with the intention of preserving cohe-
sion and consistency within the limits of a paper. 
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1. Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Post-Cold War Order 
The lenient end of the Cold War raised the expectations for an "end of 
the history" of wars, especially in Europe (Fukujama 1990). The peace-
ful dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia cheered the 
expectations. The brutality of the events in Yugoslavia and other spots 
of the world brought the attention to intra-state security situations and 
their implications. 
The !essons from intra-state conflicts revealed that the traditional 
schools of International Relations do not pro vide enough and satisfac-
tory tools for the understanding of"the current status ofwar and peace 
in the international system" (Jung and Schlichte, 1999: 35). There is a 
tendency in the literature to eut up the reality in a way that corresponds 
to the practice the international affairs are organized by assuming states 
as ac tors acting in an anarchical ordering princip le and subject of secu-
rity. Focused on the state-centric view, security remains a ' commodity 
concept' associated with power distribution, and related legacy effects 
with the international system of states, while hu man and social dimen-
sions remain in a subordinated position (McSweeny, 1 999). Facing the 
dynamics of intra-state conflict, this fragmented analysis appears to be 
increasingly arbitrary and revealing anomalies to the present security 
studies, where there is confusion asto the nature of the actors subject to 
security and to the relevance of domestic structures in the relations be-
tween the states, as weil as to the security issues in the international 
system. 
Coming from a quantitative generalization, traditional approaches 
do not count for the peculiarities ofwar events ( either war is bilateral or 
multilateral, general or regional, intra-state or inter-state); and conse-
quently, in the peace building process, the effect of democratie norms 
on the strategie behavior of actors is overemphasized while culture, 
social identities, and cognitive processes are ignored (Maoz 1997). Going 
beyond traditional understanding of the prospects of war and peace, 
these factors should be taken into account in the case of conflict under-
standing and peace building processes. 
lntra-state conflicts have proved not to be state affairs any more. The 
distinction between inter-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts is be-
coming less clear, and it depends on from which point of view one is 
looking at the conflict. Therefore, "if a province, an integrated portion 
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of the state's territory or a fraction of the population, refuses to submit 
to the centralized power and undertakes an armed struggle, the conflict, 
though civil war will regard to international war, will be considered a 
foreign warby th ose who see the rebets as the expression of an existing 
or nascent nation" (Aron, 1981: 7). Furthermore, in more than few cases, 
the state-centric concept of authority and related practices and strate-
gies have been revealed to be detrimental in the sense of sacrifying 
human values for the values of sovereignty and territorial inviolability/ 
integrity. The state failed to be the protector of its citizens and turned 
into a security threat to them (Meller, 2000) instead. Not always can the 
state be personified and identified with its own citizens or considered 
as the most optimal form of organization th at in the best of ways looks 
ftrst and foremost after its own citizens' interests and security. The state 
of citizenship . .. "is beingjeopardized by the trend toward national, sub-
national and ethnie re-territorialisation" (Hassner, 1993: 129). The 
claims of different ethnie-groups for self-determination in the face of 
minority oppression are transformed into conflicts involving disputes 
over autonomy and sovereignty. The existence of the state is at stake 
but the threat this time is not coming from hostile and inimical states 
but from within the state itself. The dichotomy of self-determination 
and sovereignty is perceived as the challenge of the post Cold War 
order. 
The crisis and intra-state conflicts in the Balkans, in the last decade 
were an expression of the erosion of the state 's ability to deal with the 
problems of its own citizens and developments in its terri tory. The tierce 
break-up ofYugoslavia and the continuation of its dissolution is part of 
this eroding process. Abhorrent phenomena of extreme human rights 
violations, such as massive killings, ethnie cleansing, and deportations 
of population with the purpose of territorial dispossession were part of 
the process. The answers of the international community to such devel-
opments have moved beyond traditional practices, bringing "humani-
tarian and human rights law cl oser to the forefront of modem conflict 
resolution processes" and "interventions as an important response op-
tion available to international society"(Ryan, 1997: 77). 
Solution and peace-building processes in the case of intra-state con-
flict tend towards cultural integrity rather than territorial integrity, as 
weil as towards the promotion of human rights versus self-determina-
tion in short tenn and regional integration in long tenn. Actually, the 
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acting framework is not clear; an expression of such uncertainty is the 
coexistence of two perspectives in the international practice: the neo-
realist perspective of focusing on the state as a central point of author-
ity, and the liberal perspective based on liberal princip les of universal 
respect for human rights and rights of self-determination, which are 
meant to coexist as parts of the same process especially in the peace 
building stage. In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the th en Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations framed as such this controversial existence: 
"respect for [state] fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to 
any common international progress" even "the time of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty .... bas passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality" (Butros-Ghali, 1992). 
1. 1. Intra-State Cm~flict and the Nature ofThreats to Security 
lntra-state conflicts speak out for tensions that exist in the internai realm 
of the state, while not ali of them are a threat of security to the existence 
of the state. When a group's security spells insecurity for others, then it 
certainly constitute a serious 'societal security' problem that can be trans-
lated as a threat to "sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evo-
lution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and 
national identity and custom" (Buzan, 1991: 19). This societal security 
dilemma may escalate as tàr as the exhaustion of the resources or the 
elimination of one party through such abhorrent manifestations as eth-
nic cleansing, or genocide, or through weakening the adversary, thus 
causing enormous and especially irreparable damages to the partici-
pants. The objective of such manifestations is the elimination of the 
other's social existence, and that is why civilians, women, children and 
youth, as the seeds of society continuation and generation, are the pre-
ferred targets. The situation reveals "the collapse of the state monopoly 
on the use of force and recognised social relations which forces an 
ethnicization of society" (Schoch, 200 l :57). Un der these considerations 
"society is not just a sector of state security, but a distinctive referent 
abject along si de it" (Waever, 1993: 26-27). 
Nevertheless, not ail the internai conflicts, not even dissolution 
movements can break out into war. Intra-state conflicts erupt in a vio-
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lent manner and become separatist movements when they "involve an 
armed confrontation between a sovereign independent state and a re-
gionally-based movement seeking to break away or seeking an ex-
tended form of internai territorial self-rule" (Heraclides, 1997: 682). 
ln essence, they witness the complexity of the security question as 
well as the linkage between state, societal and human security (M0ller 
2000:33), where "the state is at most a mean but never an end in it-
selî' (M0ller, 1993:12). 
Accordingly, societal security contlict threatens to become a politi-
cal security problem affecting the state in question, if it is manifested in 
a struggle for secessionism challenging the fundamental princip le of its 
existence, sovereignty. Obviously, the events in one country would im-
pact the other countries of the region if "[r]egional security define a 
group of states, whose primary security concems link together suffi-
ciently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be con-
sidered apart from an other". From such perspective, security is a 
complex concept, which implies the security at three levels: individu-
ais, states, and the international system; complementarily "the security 
of each become in part, a condition for the security of ali'' (Buzan, 
1991 :26-27). To sum up, "individual and global security are the two 
sides ofthe same coin" (M01ler, 1993:13). 
1.2. Societal and Jdentity Security Di/emma 
Intra-state conflicts jeopardise the societal relationships within a 
multiethnic state. Obviously societal security concems relate with iden-
tity preservation as the process and practice that construct peoples' and 
groups' self-image and perpetuate their group existence (McSweeney, 
1999: 69; Waever, 1993: 25). Societal security dilemma in most of the 
cases is translated as an identity security dilemma. ln Buzan's terms, 
"societies are fundamentally about identity. They are about what enable 
a group of peoples to refer to them selves as 'we' ... The defining modes 
of 'we', 'us' and 'them' are ail challenged by the formation of new 
identities, and the movement of peoples carrying different identities" 
(Buzan, 1993: 5-6). 
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Identity is a social "process of constructive negotiating, manipulat-
ing or affirming a response to the demand - at times urgent, rnostly 
absent- for collective image" (McSweeney, 1999:78). Societal identity 
is mainly defined in function of ethnicity and religion, which "have 
acquired prominence ... because of their historical association with the 
development of the modem state" (Waever, 1993:23 ). 
Social identity speaks out differences depending on group "inter-
subjective understandings and expectations, on the 'distribution of 
knowledge' that constitute .. . conceptions of self and others" (Wendt, 
1992: 397). Spelling out collective differences do not self-generate se-
curity problems. Differences can be a source of richness, dynamics and 
progress or vice versa, depending on the negotiated interest and collec-
tive norms whereabouts understanding reveals the patterns of mu tuai 
responsiveness in the process of interaction. Identity procreates a secu-
rity dilemma when it is used as a political leverage that reflects conflict 
of interests on the preservation of power dominance and structure of 
relationship. The conflictual interaction is manifested with the imposi-
tion of identity in egoistic manifestations rather th an co-operative on es, 
"with the ethna-national collective seen as the only guarantor of protec-
tion in an increasing cl imate of fear" {Schoch, 200 l: 58). The escalation 
of conflict leads to chain reaction effects, which entai! fragmentation. 
At this point the process raises security concerns for the state since its 
sovereignty and territoriality are threatened. 
The conflictual interaction is legitimised by a historical discourse 
that procures authority and legitimacy upon the applied argument that 
interprets identity in function of the effects of discourses of danger. 
Although the arguments are accurately selected, historical past 
overemphasises the dramas and features that will help national distinc-
tiveness and will establish a culture of resistance towards the 'others' in 
order to reclaim and reinhabit the pretended land. Culture groups (i.e. 
ethnie, language and religious groups) in particularity attach primordial 
impmtance to the territory since they are related to specifie territories 
and habitats. 
The net infusion of cultural factors with historical selective evidence 
raises the hostility levels while reducing the likelihood of non-violent 
conflict resolution opening the way to war (Singer, 1970: 166). In most 
cases the cultural differences do not light belligerence but they can be 
exploited successfully by elites to mobilize support for war. Elites can 
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highly influence the redefinition of national interests, inclining them 
towards the 'common good' by using the authority ofknowledge1 and 
formai institutions (Haas, 1997)2 . Each community is forced to believe 
that its well-being is conditioned by the disadvantages of the other corn-
muni ti es and that they can make progress only at the others ' costs. Vio-
lence erupts because of the radicalisation of the internai fears and 
suspicions producing the counter-values of what previously existed, 
spelling out fragmentation and disunity. And that is exactly what hap-
pened in the case ofYugoslavia. 
2. Internai Dimension of Kosovo/a Conflict 
After the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Kosovo/a remained a simple province of Serbia, having lost its autono-
mous status in 1989. The fragile internai equilibrium that existed before 
the conflict ended up in total jeopardy and the parallel administration 
that existed as a de facto partition created ground for a de iure partition. 
The long existing conflict between the Serb and Albanian communities 
turned into a real war. ln Heraclides' (1997) terms, the causes that lead 
to this situation are attributed to too many factors. They are ofhistorical 
nature related to the drawing of the borders, of ethnie nature re garding 
the definition of nationality and citizenship and thus the status of mi-
norities and the status of autonomy. Furthermore, the internai changes 
that are particular to multinational, multiethnic or multi-religious states 
1 Here it is important to understand the way knowledge is generated and its discursive 
relationship with power, rather than its anonymous imposition of structural reason or 
presupposed modes of enunciation. Truth in knowledge is quite often dependent on 
power. Sec Foucoult (1984, 1990) for the power-knowledge relalionship. For an ex-
ample sec the "Memorandum" issucd by the Scrbian Academy of Arts and Science that 
providcd the scientific guidelines for solving "the Serbian Question" (Anastastasijevic, 
2000). This was the ideological platfonn thatjustified Milosevic's actions . 
2 In Haas vocabulary elites are named 'epistemic communities ' and their role is scen as 
positive. Here his argument is used in more generalist tenns, implying both positive or 
negative directions, whichever the predisposition is. 
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in the period of transition from a communist regime that suppressed by 
force such conflicts without finding a real solution to them could be 
added to the causal factors. And, in the case of Kosovo, they all fo-
mented the way to contlict. 
Kosovo/a technically is a province within the legal framework of the 
Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia. Albanians 
and Serbs have divergent historical perceptions, each side claiming the 
primacy of its historie and cultural rights. The Albanians trace their 
origins back to the Illyrians that descended in the Balkans long before 
the Slavic populations. For the Serbs, Kosovo/ais the historical cradle 
of the Serbian nation and the center of the medieval Neman} a Empire. 
With the defeat of the Serb and other Balkan forces including the Alba-
nians, by the Ottomans at the hattie of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the Serbian 
independence was lost. 
The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 were successful in overthrowing the 
Ottoman Empire almost completely from the Balkans. Serbia, by win-
oing the war against Bulgaria, expanded its territory to the East, includ-
ing ali of present day Macedonia and Kosovo/a (Skendi 1967: 36-39). 
This configuration continued later in the successive Yugoslav entities. 
In retrospect, cultural differences that emerged from various religions 
proved to be an effective marker of national or ethnie identity, which in 
turn, created distinctive customs, rituals and beliefs that shaped the ev-
eryday !ife of the citizens. This social diversity would later be one of 
the incentives to encourage and revive Serbian nationalism (Ledrer, 1963: 
3-80), particularly after the eighties. In fact, the deterioration in inter-
ethnie relations is also due to political, economie and social imbalances 
between the two communities. 
Compared with other nations in Yugoslavia, the Al banians had a very 
different position. Little attempt was made to integrate Albanians into 
Yugoslav society. Kosovo remained the poorest region of former Yugo-
slavia, and has one of the highest birth rates in Europe (nearly 3 per-
cent) and a very traditional social and family pattern. Albanians had a 
second class position in the framework of the Republic of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1998: 66). Poor living conditions, repression and 
the second class position of the Albanians led to the street demonstra-
tions in the capital of Kosovo/a, Prishtina in the 1960s. After the harsh 
repression of Albanian demonstrations in the 1960s by the Yugoslav 
government, Kosovo/a was given the status of autonomous province in 
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1969, Under the terms of the 1974 Constitution, it was given the status 
of autonomous region with its own institutions. 
The constitution of 1974 gave more power to the units by decentral-
izing and delegating the power from the central auth01ity of the federa-
tion to the republics, where republics were identified with the majority 
nation. This was the first step towards the new nationalism that resulted 
in a "constitutional nationalism" and later on completed the process of 
"ethnicisation" of communist pol ici es that had started during the 1970s 
(Hayden, 1992: 654-673). The system prevented discussions on national 
issues, suppressing the national question by appeals for unification based 
on communist ideology and dogmas, without taking into consideration 
ali the great differences between the nations and cultural traditions, the 
lev el of economie development and patterns of social organization. The 
granting of the autonomy created tensions, it being considered inad-
equate by both the Al banians and the Serbs. 
Another important factor that arose from the tensions between the 
two communities was the economie crisis that swept the over-all struc-
ture ofthe Yugoslav self-management system during the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. This deepened the already existing gap in the 
relations among the republics. In theory, self-management was perceived 
as an appropriate instrument, considering that the economie response 
was going to abate the political crises (Sekelj, 1993). Economie prob-
lems affected different regions and nations in different ways, providing 
a fertile soil for extremist movements. To sum up, economie disparities 
between the regions, self-management, decentralization refom1 and eco-
nomie crises induced regional economie nationalism within Yugoslavia 
(Pleskovic- Dolenc, 1982). These features became exacerbated in the 
framework of the Se rb Republic, because a large increase in the Al ba-
nian population was added to the economie crises. The growing dissent 
as a result of the economie difficulties led to a massive exodus of the 
Serbs and Montenegrins towards Serbia and Montenegro proper. ln 1981, 
large demonstrations of Albanians aimed at obtaining the status of Re-
public for Kosovo/a that ended, in 1989, in the annulment of the status 
of the autonomy and de facto imposition on the Albanians of direct 
Serbian rule. This act was followed by the proclamation of an lndepen-
dent Republic of Kosovo/a in September 1991 following a referendum 
in which 90 percent of the population voted. The proclamation of the 
independence gave life to the parallel shadow govemment of Ibrahim 
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Rugova. Rugova, with his Gandhian-type policy, encouraged parallel 
!ife, and created a society of Albanians with separated political, cul-
tural, educational, health and media structures. This political move aimed 
at the avoidance of conflict with Serb authorities and gain support for 
the international recognition of independence. This was a strategy based 
upon the knowledge that forceful secessionist movements are not justi-
fiable und er the present practices of international law, if the aim of in-
ternational law is the preservation of the state. In nature, this effort 
prevents de facto organic groups to be regarded as states (Aron, 
1981: 120). ln practice, in other cases, such as the one of the Biafra war, 
the UN denied the request for secession. 
Facing the dramatic changes in the framework of Yugoslavia and 
their repercussions on Serbia, the interests of communities in the latter 
were generated in the process of reinforcing identity separateness. Close 
analysis ofthe internai situation reveals that the perceptions in the Serbian 
side are affected not only by nostalgie considerations that perceive 
Kosovo/a as the heartland of Serb nationalism, the issue on which 
Milosevic came to power and the defeat caused his failure but also by 
fears that Kosovo/a could be the first step of a long chain of secessions. 
That fuelled insecurities for the future of the Serbian State and perspec-
tives that would shrink it to ethnie borders, leaving Serbs alone within 
their already shmnken national state (territories inhibited by Serbs are 
currently included in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia). 
With the dissolution ofYugoslavia the Serb interests received a great 
blow considering that "Yugoslav project and the Greater Serbia project 
were ... complementary to each other". Although "Yugoslavia was never 
pro-Serbia, ... it provided two basic guarantees" important for Serbian 
nation: the protection of the Serb identity and safety under the Federa-
tion roof. This logic justify the dialectics of the situation "the more the 
Serbs insisted on living together if Yugoslavia disintegrated, the more 
the northern republics wanted to secede; ... more Serbians in the remain-
ing Yugoslavia" more it spurred secession (Wiberg, 1993: 100-101). 
This situation puts the question of Kosovo/a and Serbian perceptions in 
broader context. The secession of Kosovo/a could precipitate similar 
claims in Vojvodina and Sandjak by Hungary and Muslim minorities 
respectively (Clement, 1997). 
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3. Future Prospects for the Balkans and Kosovo/a 
Working out a regime based on democratie norms and values is consid-
ered as the best approach for the Balkans. This judgment is rooted in 
two arguments: first, the small units are not viable, and second, draw-
ing clear dividing !ines based on ethnicity especially in the Balkans is 
practically impossible. The Stability Pact for South Eastem Europe rep-
resents the European Union's main mechanism for the stability and in-
tegration of the region into European structures. "Lasting peace and 
stability in South Eastem Europe will on! y become possible when demo-
cratie principles and values, which are already actively promoted by 
many countries in the region, have taken root throughout, including in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, lü June 1999). Stress is put on the creation of a sustainable 
regime based on democratie values, respect for human and minority 
rights and the development of multilateral and bilateral cooperation based 
on the convergence of interests, and aiming to foster social inclusion 
and cohesion that willlead to regional integration. 
The Stability Pact has no resources of its own; it mere! y keeps the 
region on the EU's agenda. Three working tables at regional leve! will 
carry out the whole endeavor, coordinated by a High Leve! Steering 
Group3 that is working out a regional assistance strategy that will pro-
vide for economie reconstruction, stabilizing reform and development 
of the South-East European Region. The Pact is supposed to assume the 
combination ofthree assumptions that are considered important for the 
maintenance of social order: exchange relations, threat system and im-
3 The High Levet Stecring Group (HLSG) is co-chai red by the European commissioner 
for Economie and Monetary Affairs and the President of the World Bank. lts member-
ship inctudes the Finance ministers of Canada, France, Gennany, Ital y, Japan, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Portugal (representing the Presidency of 
the European Union), as weil as the Managing Director oflntemational Monetary Fund, 
the President of the European lnvestment Bank and the President of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the Special Coordinator of the Stabitity Pact of 
South-Eastern Europe, and the Deputy-Secretary-Generat of the United Nations. In 
addition, a number of devetopment Ministers, as weil as the Finance Minister of the 
Netherlands and the representative of the UN Mission in Kosovo are associated to the 
deliberations of the HLSG. 
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age integration (Boulding, 1989). Exchange relations presume the de-
velopment of a sustainable economie environment based on fostering 
economie and trade relations aiming at the convergence of economie 
interests. Threat system is based on an externat soft deterrence related 
with financial aid and conditional integration in the EU and other West-
ern institutions. Image integration will provide for the harmonization of 
the perceptions and interests based on the development of confidence, 
trust and security measures that are the result of an enhanced multi-
dimensional intercourse environment. 
The aftermath process in Kosovo/ais a mixture of different policies 
that, at the end, aim to provide a sustainable solution to the Kosovo/a 
question. First of ail, the international community is working on the 
consolidation of internai democratie balance in the region as legitima-
tion, if not an additional guaranty for the credibility of the process. On 
the other band, with the arrivai of moderate leaders in leadership, both 
in Kosovo/a and Serbia, a po licy of rapprochement and dialogue is en-
visaged followed by policies that aim at reducing tensions and graduai 
confidence building. Ail these policies intend to moderate the request 
for self-detennination as a precaution for avoiding fragmentation at a 
regional leve!. ln the long term, an integration at the regionallevel sup-
ported by the adoption of strong measures to protect minority rights 
seems likely to solve the Balkans' problems. 
The philosophy behind such a policy is rooted in the healing values 
of democracy. This is done in the beliefthat democracy has transformed 
the nature of the nation-state "giving way to a new system in which 
nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their neighbourhoods 
to make a virtue out of porous borders and intertwined economies and 
cultures"(Talbot, 2000: 155). It has well-developed mechanisms for 
opening borders and societies, protecting minorities, empowering re-
gions, pursuing trans-national cooperation, and promoting the princip le 
that differences in language and culture can be a source of strength 
rather than of division. ln this regard, it contributes to the consolidation 
ofpeace stability and prosperity based on the establishment of bonds of 
trust between individuals, social groups and countries in the region . 
The success of the politics based on these theoretical guidelines de-
pends on many factors. First of ail, it depends on the willingness of the 
internai factors to cooperate and be flexible towards the recommenda-
tions. Another important incentive is the willingness of the international 
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actors to maintain a sustained commitment in the region, not acting 
only when a crisis blows up. Imposed frameworks have been character-
ized by Beatrice Pouligny (Autumn 2000) as failing to capture, articu-
late or modify the routine communal and network negotiations that 
actually shape the societal concerns. Moreover, the international 
community's attention to, and investments in "elections, repatriation 
and measurable macro-economie stability projects on the one hand, 
stands in marked contrast to the limited investment in qualitative social 
and civil society programs on the other. Concepts of poli ti cal account-
ability and representation have made little headway" (Pugh, 2000: 17) 
in the region and in Kosovo/a in particular. The main problem as iden-
tified by Garton Ash "is the sheer lack of political will - that we are 
prepared to spend $13 billion to fight the war in Kosovo but we have 
not been prepared to spend $2 billion to secure the peace" (April 2000). 
Maybe the time has come to give more space to the ignored voices 
and show the political courage to absorb ali we have been going through 
during this conflict, to recognize ali that has changed, and to adapt to ail 
that is about to change again. The breach between the Albanian and 
Serb communities is manifested as a struggle over power and identity, 
which in turn acts as a critical intervening variable between extemal 
factors and internai formal-institutional outcomes. The interaction be-
tween the communities within Serbia and Kosovo as part of this struggle 
reveals a playing according to the imposed rules: advocating certain 
democratie cornmitments and practices while undermining many oth-
ers according to the actors' interests and preferences. Democracy works 
when communities share the commitment to its values. Communities, 
Serb and Al banian alike, have accentuated the identity patterns of dif-
ferentiation through processes and institutions. The last war acccntu-
ated ethnie identity and deepened hatred. Promotîng a self-sustained 
democracy in such an environment is very difficult, almost impossible, 
at least in a lifetime. Democracy means the willingness to let y our group 
be outvoted and to have courage to cooperate with the competing group 
or party. This needs trust and confidence that nothing threatening will 
come from a change in power. And this is hard to achieve after a war of 
attrition (Friedman, 2001 ). 
The self-detennination of Kosovo/a would help the democratization 
of Serbia, which is in line with the international community's objec-
tives . In this way, the Serbs would be able to establish a state without 
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national problems, national hatred and Serbophobia. Nations in the 
Balkans have to leam to live si de by side with each other through creat-
ing, reproducing, and changing the culture of conflict by way of leam-
ing to appreciate and respect each other in the shared process ofbuilding 
a common home for everyone. 
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